Why do people become atheist?

"Because atheism is right!" exclaims an excited secular audience. After all, science has negated the need to believe in God, hasn't it? And those that still believe in God are just deluded, right? Hopefully my previous two blogs (here and here) will go some way to highlighting that this assertion shouldn't be made lightly, but there is still much to be said about the psychological motivations behind theism and atheism. Of course, we're well aware of the psychological motivations behind religious belief (i.e. that believing in order and purpose provides comfort) but, aside from the misconception that science and religion are incompatible, what other reasons could cause people to reject religion and act with hostility towards it?

Negative stereotyping of religion

In a world full of Jehovah's witnesses, street preachers and hysterical fundamentalists, it's hardly surprising that religion carries with it such an unfavourable reputation. Frankly, if it's a choice between being a person that waves around their arms whilst trying to cram a Bible down someone's throat or not being one of those people, you'd probably opt for the latter. Unfortunately though, as is often the case, it's the vocal minority that get their voices heard and, while the majority of people practice their faith in a peaceful fashion, it's usually the religious nuts (the people that put the 'mental' in 'fundamental') that make the headlines.

There's actually a serious point in all this. You see, stereotypes are often formed by our exposure to others. When we see lots of crazy religious people, it’s only natural to assume that all of them are crazy as, generally, we’re not exposed to the quieter ones that function as perfectly normal, civil beings. Once we have a stereotype it’s hard to get rid of it too, and the maintenance of stereotypical belief can often be explained through psychological attribution biases: The Illusory Correlation Effect, for instance, explains that people acknowledge patterns in behaviour that confirm stereotypical beliefs (i.e. incompetent religious individuals are remembered) and casually ignore those that don't (i.e. competent religious people are forgotten) as they’re considered anomalies. We have a bias for seeking out information that confirms our beliefs about people for a number of reasons; it makes information easier to manage, it provides satisfaction to have our beliefs confirmed and brings comfort to us when we're right. This is all very interesting, but it can cause us to form and maintain unfair impressions of others.

Of course, religious individuals can be guilty of forming false impressions of the non-religious too, but the religious appear to be at greater risk of judgement when people attach more moral significance to theism. In criminal psychology, for instance, Double Deviance theory explains that women are often judged more harshly for criminal offences (particularly violent crimes and crimes against children) than men1. The reason being that these behaviours are seen as a greater departure from female gender expectations (so, women are judged not only for the crime, but for their deviance from what is expected of them). This principle extends to religious belief: Despite religious and non-religious individuals being equally likely to behave in a moral or immoral way, immoral acts from the religious are considered to hold more significance (as they impact directly on a moral code that is asserted by religion) than the same acts from the non-religious. Because of these reasons, it seems to be easier to form and maintain negative stereotypes of the religious than the non-religious.

Attribution of religious behaviour

Sometimes, we can think that religion causes people to do bad things, and it’s here that we can turn to another attribution bias, the Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE), to explain why. The FAE explains that, in general, we’re quick to assume that someone behaves in a certain way because of personal factors, and not because of other, external, factors. For instance, we may see someone speeding past in a car dangerously and conclude that they're reckless and irresponsible, but, as soon as an external factor becomes apparent (that they're making an emergency trip to the hospital), we realise our previous judgement was premature. Often, there are two reasons for the FAE occurring: the first is that we don't have all facts needed to make a correct attribution; the second (and more crucial) reason is that we don't like the idea that something environmental can take control of someone. (The thought that people can be controlled by situations unpredictably is a very unsettling thought.) We want to able to explain individuals' behaviour easily. It's no surprise then that we’re quicker to attribute negative behaviour to an individual's own doing before accepting that negative behaviour was forced upon them.

The FAE can be used to explain hostility toward religious (and non-religious) individuals but, more importantly, can also explain why people mis-attribute the cause of war to religion: Often, people will see there's a war going on, that the opposite sides have different religious views, put 2 and 2 together and come up with a banana. The fact is, the vast majority of wars are triggered by non-religious factors (greed, expansionism) with no link to religion at all2. However, we have a bias for believing religion to be the catalyst in war because, if we can identify a cause, we have a means of preventing it. Without religion as a scapegoat, we must accept that people war against themselves unpredictably and uncontrollably, and that's a bit scary.

There actually isn't much evidence to suggest that religion can cause individuals to act anti-socially either. In 'The Myth of Martyrdom', Adam Lankford explains that suicidal bombers are simply suicidal and not psychologically-sound people indoctrinated by religion. Why, then, do we believe that they are? One simple explanation is that it's easier to label suicide bombers as monsters before accepting that they are simply troubled, suicidal people. Attributing their behaviour to religion provides us with a mechanism to differentiate between evil monsters and troubled people. Take this away, and things get uncertain and scary (and perhaps quite offensive too); the boundaries between these two seemingly distinctive groups become blurred and that, again, is a very unsettling thought.

Liberation from an omnipotent being

The late Christopher Hitchens brought many insightful arguments to the debate on God's existence, and one criticism of his in particular stood out: that religion is like a totalitarian government; a '1984’-esque environment where everyone is monitored constantly by a live 'thought police'. Richard Dawkins has gone further, claiming God to be "the most unpleasant character in all fiction" 3 and, as part of the 2007 'atheist bus' campaign, ran the slogan “There’s probably no God, so stop worrying and enjoy life4. It’s clear then that, while the religious take comfort in God's existence, atheists find the presence of God very troubling. This desire to reject God stems from a bias for behaviour that is just as influential (arguably, more so) than the bias of accepting God: That rejection from faith is liberating; a freedom.

We need only look as far as the research into the Bystander Effect to understand that individuals tend to act very differently when they feel as though they're being watched. People are more reluctant to act freely for fear of being judged by others. Being watched stifles freedom and forces us to act in prototypical ways. In a series of experiments, Bibb Latane and John Darley found that participants didn't act the way they wanted to (or thought they should) for fear of being judged by others around them, even when these acts were pro-social. The more people that are present, the more limits there are on how people can behave. We can speculate that belief in God's presence is an extension of this, particularly as this effect is even observed when others (and potential judges) are absent from a room but are still believed to be nearby5.

It's clear then that people feel that their behaviour is restricted when being watched and, when this is taken away, we become more liberated. Together, these psychological concepts explain that part of the reason some non-religious individuals may not believe God to exist is simply because they don't want God to exist.

The desire for elitist status

Finally, there are other, social, reasons why people may want to reject religion: Atheism is traditionally considered the more intellectual, open-minded position to take. While that's open to debate, the perception of intellectual elitism alone could explain a further bias for rejecting religion. For instance, some atheists become very upset at the thought that atheism is a faith, even though the logic is unassailable (if naturalism, as an assertion that God doesn't exist, cannot be proved then, by definition, it must be a faith). While the reactions to such a claim can often be quite amusing, it is interesting nonetheless to consider why it causes such upset. One explanation is because asserting atheism as a faith (or even a religion) removes the opportunity to be part of an elitist group and lumps atheists in the same category as religious believers; a group which (for the reasons above) they have been quite keen to avoid.

Conclusion

In conclusion, while many people are drawn to atheism because they consider it to provide more solid explanations for our existence, it’s important to be mindful of the other psychological factors that may drive this decision.

However, no matter what your opinion, just remember that we're all susceptible to psychological bias!



1 See: Heidensohn, F. (1989). Crime and Society, Hampshire and London. MacMillan Education, and Lloyd, A. (1995). Doubly deviant, doubly damned: society's treatment of violent women. Penguin Books. ^
2 The 'Encyclopaedia of War' identifies that about 7% of wars in human history can be attributed to religion. ^
3 Dawkins, R. (2009). The God Delusion. ^
4 Bold formatting added. See BBC report here. ^
5 Darley, J. M., & Latane, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: diffusion of responsibility. Journal of personality and social psychology, 8, 377. ^

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